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Present Times Concerning Things Past:
On Recent Conceptions of  Memory
Zoltán Hidas
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Institute of  Sociology
„Wer nicht von dreitausend Jahren 
Sich weiß Rechenschaft zu geben, 
Bleib im Dunkeln unerfahren, 
Mag von Tag zu Tage leben.”
J. W. v. Goethe
    
After sketching modern experiences and visions of  historicity, the present study 
outlines two fundamental modes of  our relationship to present time and memory. In 
an ideal typical way, two theoretical conceptions are contrasted for this purpose. A 
radical system theory of  time presumes that there has been a rupture in the human 
temperament, which has opened our understanding of  time functionally by focusing 
in an accelerating manner on the future. The cultural memory paradigm asserts the 
existence of  the individual as a genuine part of  remembering communities, who draws 
orientations from the past. In the terms of  the Hegelian philosophy of  history, we have 
here the pragmatic representation of  the past for the sake of  efficiency on the one hand 
and the search for an internal order of  the most heterogeneous events for the sake of  
discovering continuity in human activity on the other.
Keywords: philosophy of  history, system theory, cultural memory, relation to the past, 
presentism
In this essay, I pose questions concerning time and, more narrowly, the ways in 
which, recently, we have come, essentially, to relate to our memories. I begin with 
a presentation of  the modern shift in historical conciousness (1) and then, based 
on a theoretical design outlined by G.W.F. Hegel in his philosophy of  history 
(2), offer a discussion of  two fundamentally different concepts of  time and 
memory which strive to grasp in a consistent ideal-typical way the potentials of  
the modern era for assessing perspectives of  time. Both take the present as their 
point of  departure, but they assign different roles to the past. One presumes 
that there has been a rupture in the human temperament (3), while the other 
firmly asserts the existence of  the individual as a genuine part of  communities 
(4). Among the ways in which we relate to past, a third possibility also recurringly 
appears, but it seeks a radical withdrawal from the world of  events.
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Modern Experiences and Visions of  Historicity
In an era marked by a seemingly infinite proliferation of  differences which, 
according to diagnoses based on the most varied approaches, break the inner 
and outer human world into spheres that seem increasingly independent of  one 
another, a longing for continuity and interconnection among the pieces emerges 
with renewed strength. In a life-world of  “contingency” and “fragmentation”, 
which on a temporal horizon that has been brought into motion both sensually 
and spiritually strike an era named (without any classification of  events based on 
content) modernity, the search for orientation falters between the present and 
the past in order to gain perspective for the future, which is regarded as open. 
But neither the present, which is permanently in motion, nor the past, which is 
seen as inexhaustible, offers any certainties that seem beyond doubt.1
Of  course, these empiric and semantic changes of  historicity only cause 
problems of  immediate urgency for a manner of  relating to the world that seeks 
to situate itself  in time, as it were. Greek antiquity significantly aspired to attain 
solid models (“ideas” and “forms”) considered eternal and therefore worthy of  
imitation, so that it could realize them in evanescent time. The Judeo-Christian 
notion of  divine “providence” sacralized some of  the events of  the world into 
a story of  redemption, but it could only give them religious significance with the 
appeal to faith in the idea that “nothing happens except by the will of  God.” 
For the early Christian, the existence of  the Roman empire was for the most 
part an uninteresting contingency: the “heavenly city” was an inner issue.2 The 
man of  the time did not have a developed sense of  the theological significance 
of  the prevailing order of  the imperial milieu, much as there was no real 
recognition of  the thought of  the broad historical horizon and the fertile social 
soil as a potential sociological precondition of  the spread of  the new religion. 
Anticipations aligned with the presence of  the “end of  times,” which seemed to 
be prefigured and were indeed institutionally represented. The primary reference 
points of  memory, however, were given by the correlation of  the history of  the 
Jewry, which was led by God, to the events of  the last days in the life of  Jesus 
as promises fulfilled. 
As the Western world becomes increasingly open to purely secular 
approaches (on the basis in part of  its own—political, scientifical etc.—efforts 
1  See e.g. Makropoulos, Modernität und Kontingenz.
2  Augustine: De Civitate Dei, Books XVII–XVIII. Important exceptions include Origen (III) and Orosius 
(IV–V).
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and in part of  the gradual consent of  religion),3 for a long time people thought to 
find valid handholds in time, seeing themselves on the heights of  development 
as they progressed along a path from a rudimentary but clearly identifiable 
past to a valuable near-future, designated from the outset. The philosophy of  
history projects of  the modern era unfold the large-scale whole that continues to 
hold together the spheres of  the world that function according to independent 
principles: global economic growth, global political unification attains in the 
universal world history the consummation of  the principles of  humanity that 
are claimed and hoped to be general. History understood in the singular, as 
the notion of  a unity that goes beyond the multitude of  separate histories, can 
develop as the horizon of  humanity, rich with meaning.4
From a rather formal perspective (in other words beyond geographical, 
historical, economic, and ideal elements), the birth of  “modernity” seems just 
to begin with the discovery of  temporality, understood in the strict sense: the 
future can be filled with acts that are seen as not bound to the past, in terms 
of  the experience and anticipation of  a kind of  “never has been before.”5 The 
logical foundation of  this idea and also its philosophical-historical cornerstone is 
an understanding of  the original temporality of  human existence. All this attains 
its fully developed form in the existentialist projects of  the “moments” that 
require life-shaping decisions and personal “life plans,” as the task of  the person 
“thrown into the world.”
Of  course, the rise of  a genuine historical consciousness always sees the 
phenomena of  culture either as in an incipient form or in decline and ruin. The 
search for that what is generally valid is thrown into suspicion afresh by the 
always possible critique that can on its own terrain attack reason and rationality 
as the supposedly highest authority. Herder’s caution was made at a time when 
the most ambitious world history projects were forming: “in a certain respect, 
every human perfection is national, secular, and, if  most closely considered, 
individual.”6 Thus, the questions concerning “essence” are replaced by the 
question concerning “formation” and “development”: metaphysics loses its 
priority of  place to geneaology. The longing for the unified and the unconditional 
have ever since been washed away again and again by the unpredictable whirlpool 
of  history, from which religious faith, which is increasinly considered irrational 
3  On these processes, see Max Weber’s study on Protestant Ethic.
4  See Koselleck,“Historia magistra vitae,” 26–42.
5  Koselleck, “Neuzeit,” 222–54.
6  Herder, “Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit,” 509.
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compared to the rationalities of  the world, continues to seek a way out, stepping 
from the familiar relevances of  the world of  everyday life into other worlds of  
meaning.7 Reflection taken to the power of  infinity has captured the generalness 
of  principled thinking, and in its cunningness and refinement it is capable of  
finding—i.e. “reflecting”—everything in everything. The strength of  and hope 
in unity is shattered by plurality, both in the inner and the outer worlds. What 
was once held to be the unity of  reason unravels into a diversity of  rationalities, 
which remain a worthy object of  renewed attempts to make rational insights.8
The formula offered a century ago by Jacob Burckhardt, who pondered 
the nature of  world history, today is only occasionally overwritten by visions of  
history garbed in scholarly guise: “history, that is coordination, is not-philosophy, 
and philosophy, that is subordination, is not-history.”9 Every exit from this circle 
of  thought is “transcedence” in the most original sense of  the word. Intellectual 
efforts to join the various worlds are given new momentum again and again by 
the human will for comprehensive unity and meaning.
The impossibility of  an inner-worldly desertion from time, in other words 
the impossibility of  a perspective that allows for total overview, makes reality 
accessible only through mediations and furthermore makes knowledge of  that 
what happened a process that can never come to conclusion. Giving up on 
post-metaphysical aspirations that are bound to theories of  knowledge or to 
the clarifying of  the capabilities of  human reason, the craft of  interpretation, 
which comes near to the status of  an art, gains ground under the label of  
“hermeneutics”. In the process of  thinking on thinking, the one-time and 
present sights of  the world appear as “concepts” or “visions” of  the world. The 
relationship between facts and interpretations is increasingly reversed: according 
to the most logically consistent formula, “there is no such thing as a pure fact” 
and every fact is an interpretation from the outset.10 For reason, which itself  is 
becoming a historically situated phenomenon, progressively unfolding world-
understanding consistently proves to be renewed world-interpretation. Knowledge 
put into human molds is a world-transforming achievement. Thus, sources also 
do not speak for themselves, but always wait to be called on by the present 
7  Schütz, “On Multiple Realities,” 207–59.
8  Schnädelbach, Vernunft, 137.
9  Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, 17.
10  For the most extreme position, see White, The Content of  the Form. According to White, the same series 
of  events can be narrated legitimately in the most varied genres, from the satire to the tragedy, the comedy, 
and the romance.
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to speak. Perspectives are offered by our own subjective relevances: setting 
out from them, the infinite plenitude of  events, which in itself  is structureless 
and unbroken, takes form. The way in which one relates to the past is always 
established in the present, and this makes it impossible, for reasons of  principle, 
for consciousness today to draw a clear line between the two. If  now it is not 
the past—the pure past, as it existed before it was discerned—that survives for 
the actual present, then the “enigma” of  time is centered in the present, instead 
of  the historical-philosohical future, which bore the hypothetical potential of  
fulfilling everything.
Saint Augustine’s famous arguments, which in his thinking still fit in the 
context of  the development of  an inner man who maintains a direct relationship 
with God, preshadow with a force that lasts to the present day our most modern 
way of  relating to time: „But even now it is manifest and clear that there are 
neither times future nor times past. Thus it is not properly said that there are 
three times, past, present, and future. Perhaps it might be said rightly that there 
are three times: a time present concerning things past; a time present concerning things 
present; and a time present concerning things future. For these three do coexist somehow 
in the soul, for otherwise I could not see them. The time present of  things past 
is memory; the time present of  things present is sight; the time present of  things 
future is expectation.”11
According to this understanding, past, present, and future are three aspects 
of  a present in which difference has arisen even with regards to itself. If  time, 
as the “expansion of  the soul”, is an inner matter for man, there is in principle 
nothing to prevent the internal rift of  “time present concerning things present” 
from becoming deeper, and the reflective-intellectual work of  centuries does 
indeed attain this. The transformation of  the idea that everything has an ordained 
time and that the rhythm of  events beats at a consistent tempo, into an eternal-
human “form of  observation” (Kant) was crowned by the notion of  time as a 
continuously shifting pattern of  human relations and our shared simultaneities 
and non-simultaneities as a well-articulated symbolic order.12 The present, 
which had once been regarded as a direct given, thus becomes the present of  
the “contemporary-world” (“Mitwelt”), invested with meanings, while the past 
that is suited to the present is a “predecessor-world” (“Vorwelt”), ever more 
distant in the generational chain and continuously shifting in its significance.13 
11  Augustine, Confessions, Book XI/20.
12  Cf. Elias, Über die Zeit.
13  Schütz, Strukturen der Lebenswelt, 129.
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The relationship to the past is humanly nurtured “culture”; the ever shifting 
manner of  dealing with time is a question of  “strategy.” According to this, the 
main question concerning our current manner of  relating to the past—beyond 
the idea of  mere mapping, which increasingly counts as little more than an 
illusion—is not the dependency of  historical knowledge on point of  view, but 
the actual weight of  the present in comparison with what has taken place, or, 
conversely, the power of  historical awareness to shape the present.
A Hegelian Typology of  Grasping History
In the introduction to the most broad philosophical world history ever written, 
Hegel offers an overview of  the possible ways of  writing history. Thus, “reflexive 
history” goes beyond the naïve primitiveness of  the great masters of  history 
writing, who dissolved in their own present. This reflexive history extends from 
the simple anachronism through a pragmatic representation of  the past to the search for 
the internal order and unity of  events in a given circle of  humanity. The philosophical 
approach, which supposes a reasonable progression of  events, steps up onto the 
highest rung of  history so that its presupposition prove necessarily true in the 
coherent progression of  events and their presentation. 
The treatment of  the past, which was becoming a matter of  scholarship, 
seeing the a-historical unfairnesses and totalistic consequences of  absolute 
measures, devoted itself  increasingly to the partial interconnections of  inner-
worldly events, and, in the thrall of  “pure facts,” for a long time it considered 
the discovery of  the “actual” events its primary task. Science, which was 
more sensitive to differences, ruptures, and ommissions, demonstrates the 
fictional nature of  the intellectual edifices of  unity. However, for self-reflective 
historical consciousness, a reading of  the memory traces that have palpably 
survived increasingly proved a form of  reconstructive work done on the basis 
of  the sources. The abstractive gestures of  science proceed from the primary 
constructions of  the everyday world, constructions with which the debate 
community, which is skeptical of  everyday evidence, is incapable of  breaking 
entirely, its experience in practical “disinterestedness” notwithstanding.14 
Because of  the uninterruptible dialectic of  terms and events, history writing 
that aspires towards universality itself  remains in part in the sphere of  influence 
14  Ibid., 245–59.
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of  the retrospective “mastering of  the past.” Any deposit of  the past, whatever 
form it takes, cannot be definitive. 
Regarding the hierarchy of  cognizance established by Hegel, the paths 
to direct accessibility of  events and the discernment of  their necessity in 
the meantime have been obstructed. Two possible procedural perspectives 
remain in the potential spaces of  recollection, more narrowly understood: the 
effectiveness of  memories correlated to particular (economic, political, religious, 
or even artistic) partial presents in the respective environment and, on the other 
hand, the horizon of  meaning of  the commemorated past, again and again 
contoured from the present. Although both projects use the implements of  
historical criticism, the focus of  the first is actuality, which ensures functionality, 
by excluding memories that are dispensable to this. The focus of  the latter is the 
manifold presence of  guarded and concealed pasts, and the derivation of  the 
future from some kind of  origin.15 As we will see, all this is not independent of  
our possible ways of  relating to ourselves either. 
According to an originally sociological insight, the sense of  acceleration 
which comes from the proliferation of  groups which transect one another in a 
single individual brings a new rhythm to the succession of  events in the past and 
the succession of  events today. The apocalyptic attitude bound the fulfillment of  
promises to the merciful arrival of  the end times and the unexpected curtailing of  
history. Among the driving forces of  the acceleration, which is also self-propelling, 
the faith in the expedient transformability of  a progressive world is intertwined 
with the intensification of  traffic and the proliferation of  contacts. The increase 
in contents of  consciousness for a single unit of  time and the rapid change in 
patterns of  behavior and associations have brought about an “intensification 
of  sensed-life” and in general a fundamental transformation of  human time.16 
In any case, the shocking experience of  the compression of  the present, which 
is experienced as something in a continuous state of  acceleration, assails with 
tremendous force the tradition of  learning from continuous narratives.17 History 
loses its quality and role as teacher: expectations concerning the future cannot 
be derived on the basis of  acquired experiences. The new present—according 
to the first project, which is becoming more and more dominant—selects the 
15  On the latter thought see Marquard, “Zukunft und Herkunft,” 45–58.
16  See Rosa, Beschleunigung, 243. Koselleck, “Gibt es eine Beschleunigung der Geschichte?,” and idem, 
“Zeitverkürzung und Beschleunigung,” 150–202. Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, 696, and idem: “Die 
Großstädte und das Geistesleben,” 227.
17  See Rushkoff, The Present Shock. Nyíri, “Historical Consciousness in the Computer Age,” 75–83. 
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requisite accessories of  functioning in the spirit of  efficacy, if  necessary even 
from the distant past. Our strategic use of  time fits well into the frameworks 
of  a manner of  relating to the world based on domination—while in the servile 
dialectic of  human and time it is increasinly difficult to find a handhold.
The Forgetful Memory of  Efficacy
Let us consider for a moment the first option: systems theory sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann has provided the most consistent theoretical examination 
and at the same time self-reflective look at the pragmatic perspective. Each of  the 
social system-worlds, which are increasingly separating from one another, is 
built on a particular distinction: according to a bivalent code, it selects or—
more precisely—creates its own elements, events, and borders in its separation 
from its immeasurable environment. Science selects truth, economics selects 
the profitable, religion selects the transcendent in the face of  falsehood, the 
unprofitable, and the immanent, and so on and so on in each of  the various 
systems of  the system-worlds. In the meantime, communication embraces the 
systems, which are closed within themselves, i.e. they are “self-referential”: the 
borders of  the social world are denoted by the borders of  communication. If  
continuity is thus nothing more than the bearing of  the systems on themselves, 
then the task is the connection of  the communicative acts that are just taking 
place to the previous ones in the interests of  maintaining the own system.
The system functionings, however, are no longer structured into a unity 
by any central ordering project. In Luhmann’s model, the systemic place of  
identity is occupied ever more consistently by difference: the abstract and 
paradoxical fundamental principle is “the difference of  identity and difference”.18 
Correspondingly, the divergent motions, which since they were first discerned 
have been expressed with metaphors of  “fragmentariness,” “fluidity,” and 
“mobility”, find structured theoretical form as “differentiation”. The systems, 
which become independent without any internal relation, live their own, 
separate times, so to speak, which for the personal experience of  the world finds 
manifestation in the impossibility of  harmonizing individually and communally 
the spheres of  life. Various system times of  varying pace and rhythm come into 
being between the cosmic world-time and the personal lifetime, which are of  
differing scales from the outset. The simultaneous multitide of  non-simultaneous 
18  See Luhmann: Soziale Systeme, 26.
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system presents compete for the inclusion of  the communicating participants—
i.e. even for their creation as communicational partners. For “psychical systems” 
(which were once called “consciousnesses”), which also count as independent 
(because they function within their own spheres of  thought), participation in 
the various projects renders establishing and ordering themselves within the 
temporal differences of  the many kinds of  present an increasingly unmanageable 
task: hindering the dispersion of  differentiation, in other words synchronizing 
the presents, is a challenge that puts the “psychical system” to the test. The 
increasingly fast-paced differentiation of  the systems, which by this time are 
preoccuppied with themselves, place our own observational position (which 
distinguishes the task immediately to be performed from all tasks that must 
be neglected) under ever stronger pressure to select. “Not to act is lost time.”19 
Complexity, which continues to build with ongoing differentiation, features the 
omitted selections as postponable. But while the future which belongs to the 
prevailing present becomes unattainable, as it were (and bears an ever larger 
quantity of  decisions),20 it contracts and becomes increasingly short because of  
the increasingly uncertain expectations. The evolutionary logic of  the process of  
variation, selection, and stabilization may imply temporality, but the necessity of  
maintaining the system does not tolerate delay.
In the present which has become permanent not only the “future cannot 
begin,”21 the continuous communicational uncertainties of  the continued 
functioning of  the systems make uncertain the status of  the past. For the 
systems, “now”, which becomes ever shorter in the difference between “before” 
and “after”, borrows a kind of  eternal present tense without duration: the 
diminuation of  the duration of  the elements to a point—already ephemeral 
in their moment of  coming into being—is an elementary interest adequate to 
the irreversibility of  time.22 If  the present is now the paradoxical unity of  the 
difference of  the past and the future, the possible point of  origin of  novelty,23 
then for the assurance of  functionality the past appears less and less as the 
present reality of  what has taken place. The past which has been chosen by 
the system as its own (a past which for a long time was called “tradition”) thus 
can reach the present, but its contents, depth, and pace contuinuously change 
19  Idem, “Temporalisierung von Komplexität,” 280.
20  Idem, Soziale Systeme, 70.
21  Idem, “The Future Cannot Begin,” 130–52.
22  See idem, “Temporalisierung von Komplexität,” 242, 296.
23  Idem, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, 1004.
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according to the exigencies of  the given present. For the time of  the everyday, 
the ever-developing technology of  data storage, which is increasingly incapable 
of  forgetting, tends to account for historical time, while the appeal to history 
becomes an incidental question. For the principle of  functionality, the historical-
causal continuity of  the past is merely a question of  expedience. Because of  the 
inexhaustibleness of  causal interconnections, the selection of  reasons that would 
be worthy of  being taken into consideration in a given case falls, furthermore, to 
the incidental observer.24
If, however, in the compression of  time the present continues to lose its 
expansure, how does the space for memory take form? The re-use of  successful 
experiences—in other words the selection of  what has been selected before, the 
repetition of  tried and tested differentiations—of  course is possible anytime 
under favorable circumstances; in this way, the self-regulating system wins time, 
so to speak. The intensification of  complexity, however, increasingly hampers a 
purely redundant self-creation. Thus, according to the explanation given by the 
systems theory sociology of  knowledge, instead of  a differentiation between 
the tranquility of  eternity and the restlessness of  change, a model origin and 
uncertain transformations, in the historical approach of  the modern era a 
temporalized self-description of  society appears and comes to culmination. 
As we already know, history “comes into being if  observation of  socially 
important events is made with consideration of  the difference of  before and 
after.”25 Historical consciousness lets the present emerge out of  the past, 
but—paradoxically—it founds the only possible identity on constantly shifting 
differences. Instead of  spatiality, the semantics of  temporality corresponds well 
to the functional differentiations of  the social world: the sense for “formations” 
and the “processes” that gave rise to them (instead of  the “essence” of  “things”) 
and “originality” (instead of  “origin”) become information for the present. 
Memory does not seek orientation simply in historical succession, but rather it 
makes its way towards an understanding of  the past which makes the present 
visible as a “space for action,” in which the novelty of  the future can be born of  
novelties past. The problems of  the actual present are none other than the always 
peculiar differences between the past and the future. Seen from the perspective 
of  systems theory, the demand for continuous rewriting of  the past (a demand 
24  Ibid., 1011.
25  Ibid., 573.
HHR_2017-4_KÖNYV.indb   734 1/9/2018   3:32:37 PM
Recent Conceptions of  Memory
735
striving for originality) stems from the search for novelty hidden in the one-time 
evolutionary variations, i.e. ruptures. 
Given all this, it is hardly coincidental that Luhmann closes his presentation 
of  the eventually timeless evolutionary logic of  systems with a discussion of  
memory.26 The presentism of  system memory that prevails in the name of  
functionality makes selections from the endless material with consideration 
of  the functioning of  the given system: it forgets anything and everything 
that it doesn’t happen to need at the moment and remembers only the one 
thing that gives continued momentum to communication. Thus, the primary 
function of  memory is, paradoxically, forgetting, even if  the self-description 
of  society continues to the present day to be wrong about this. The stakes are 
not the coherence of  events, but rather  the consistency of  the systems which 
is open to new impulses and disturbances—a consistency, which in the social 
world sometimes can even be served by historical coherence. However, with the 
obstruction of  forgetting, the culmination of  earlier results into “identity” can 
lead to the destruction of  the system. Recently, the concept of  “culture” has 
been called on, as the horizon of  comprehensive comparisons (instead of  stable 
identity), to ensure at least similarity, in spite of  every difference. Culture, as a 
vessel that is formless in and of  itself, is supposed to receive world contents, but 
at most it is capable of  duplicating them by their external observation. Today’s 
“culture” of  the past is the memory of  the social system, which of  course is quite 
aware of  its character as memory. This twofold reflection, the consideration of  
what has been bequeathed as tradition, sheds light on the double contingency 
of  the particular past: that it could have evolved differently, and something else 
could have been selected. With ordered remembering (for instance the guidance 
of  historical comparisons), culture tries to adapt to the increasingly complex 
social system-world. Systems thinking instead calls on us to observe “who uses 
what differentiations in order to offer his past for the future.”27
In society understood as communication, instead of  the bearer of  memory, 
whether personal or group, the media of  memory become important.28 Writing 
steps past the narrow sphere of  oral communication, which is bound to rites 
and formulas, and the potentials of  repetition as means of  maintenance. With 
its tremendous power to record, it makes the improbable probable and ensures 
26  Ibid., 576.
27  Luhmann: “Kultur als historischer Begriff,” 41, and idem: Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, 587, citation 
593.
28  On the undermentioned, Luhmann, Die Realität der Massenmedien, and Esposito, Soziales Vergessen.
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the connection of  the communicational events that are just beginning with those 
that preceded them. If  time can no longer be organized by acts committed eye 
to eye, then “previous” events can be taken from the most distant past if  a 
written trace of  them has survived. Concrete time, wich comes into being in the 
duality of  events transpiring and events completed, point-like and continuous, 
and is considered essentially spatial, is succeeded by the abstraction of  the distance 
between eternity and temporality: the increasing validity of  the increasingly 
distant texts thus creates transcendence.  In the wake, however, of  the process 
by which the revival from the archives of  contents that were recorded earlier (in 
other words memory) becomes increasingly independent of  the circumstances 
of  their birth, not only do untouchable canons come into being, but, ever more 
distant from the sacral centers, the arbitrary application of  the written word 
becomes possible. In recent times, the increasingly independent systems of  the 
mass media have realized this potential, which was always inherent in writing, 
amidst circumstances of  increasingly open access. Since everything that ever 
happened and is now happening can be present in an accessible manner for 
anyone in timeless simultaneity, the past counts exclusively as re-presentation. 
The communications that exist in a continuous present increasingly distinguish 
the information of  “novelty” from the redundancies of  that which is “old,” 
which is why it is increasingly difficult for the past to find any settled form.
Naturally, the logic of  differences does not leave the deliberate observer (the 
participant in and observer of  events) untouched. What was once “man” proves 
to be a plethora of  systems: the internal life of  his consciousness separates 
from his social participation in communicational systems on the basis of  
principle. Only the self-interpretations of  eras that were built on less efficacious 
differentiations (up/down, us/them, man/world) could cling to the idea of  the 
unified consistency and continuous content of  people and groups.
The Committed Remembrance of  Significance
Turning now to one of  the characteristic recent versions of  some internal order 
and unity of  events, admidst the newest precepts of  thinking concerning the 
possibilities of  cognition, even the project of  “cultural memory” can no longer 
abandon the perspective of  the present. In an era of  intensifying differences, 
however, the overview of  the present can be ensured not only by the pragmatics 
of  systemic persistence but also by passing the temporal paths that lead to us. By 
abandoning any unconditional cognition for its own sake, we make the past that 
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is significant for us the object of  our own perspectives. The designated objects 
are selected by interest that is alleged to be shared from the endless quantity of  
material. We mold the phenomena that surround us into some kind of  unity 
with regard to their antecedents. In our time, with its eminent interest in history, 
the things that are thus uncovered also play a role in the memory of  the world 
that lies beyond the scientific world, namely as a story built into the present. The 
present acts of  memory in this approach evoke historical determinations or at 
least conditions. Jan Assmann opposes his own project of  “cultural memory” 
with the presentism of  forgetting, on the basis of  the “non-simultaneity of  that 
what is simultaneous”.29
“Tradition” is one of  the antecedents of  the search for historical continuity, 
i.e. the notion of  preserving and passing on the bequeathed. The modern project 
of  education and refinement (Bildung) as omni-sided self-development establishes 
as its goal both reception of  the broadest register of  cultural phenomena and 
the creative transformation of  the world, seeking a balance between the two that 
is not defined from up close.30 For philosophical history, which in the end strives 
to seize the indispensable whole of  past, present, and future, “self-conscious 
rationality” is nothing other than the setting for rational development, “the saint 
chain that crosses events past.” Tradition understood thusly gushes onward 
across shared material and intellectual/spiritual edifices.31 However, this totality, 
though in motion, proved impossible for humankind to carry. 
For the doubts concerning the transfer of  what has been entrusted to us and 
the questions of  content concerning balance continue to proliferate if  transience 
assails the reliability of  the processes of  cognition at the roots. The clarification 
of  knowledge, which is to say the movements of  the modern era that seek to 
lay its general foundations, throw into question first and foremost the original 
prestige of  ancientness and the higher value of  historical developments, in the 
midst of  the external breaking of  the old orders. The fundamental operation 
of  reliable foundations and at the same time free self-determination will be an 
abstraction increasingly independent of  contexts. However, at almost the same 
time, adherence to transformations characterized as “organic development” 
and the consciousness of  crisis, which because of  the uncertainties has come 
to rule, raises the value of  the ideal of  tradition. The counter-movement of  
29  Assmann, “Nachwort,” 400–14.
30  See for instance Friedrich Schiller’s letters on Humanism and aesthetic education in: Schiller, On the 
Aesthetic Education, 53–57.
31  Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie 1, 21.
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historical Romanticism in the end undertakes the creation of  tradition, expecting 
an artificial stability even from invented traditions.32 In the end, however, 
the consequentiality of  dehistoricization can unveil every order of  historical 
interconnection as mere construct.
With the reappraisal of  the techniques of  hermeneutics, a lastly philosophical 
project came into being that—reckoning with the inaccessibility of  “the world as 
it is in itself ”—seeks knowledge amidst the recent conditions of  mediatedness. 
In accordance with the genuine interpretedness of  our manner of  relating to the 
world, the interconnections of  meaning or “webs of  significances” (C. Geertz) 
end up in the competencies of  man analyzing the stock of  historical tradition, 
and himself  mirrored in it. The art of  hermeneutics, which presupposes 
ambiguity, developed into a comprehensive interpretive culture. For Gadamer, 
the last stop of  the search for a path in multiplicity, which could be reached by 
the bypass of  “foreignness,” was the “fusion of  horizons”: “even where life 
changes violently, as in ages of  revolution, far more of  the old is preserved in 
the supposed transformation of  everything than anyone knows, and combines 
with the new to create a new value.”33 The culture of  hermeneutics, the roots 
of  which lie in the sacred texts of  the Western world (and which became a 
proper way of  life because of  continuous and inevitable translation work), 
presents connection with the ever increasing rows of  traditions and the bearers 
of  tradition as unavoidable.34 The fact that even reason becomes first historical 
and then linguistic shows the enormous power of  history over our thinking.
“Narrated” or “remembered” pasts strive ever more to compensate for the 
present’s loss of  orientation.35 Disenchanted history in singular proliferates into 
histories of  meaning. Identity must draw its limited substance from stories that 
establish a future, at the risk of  untranslatability and un-interpretibility. Both 
anxiety and foresight motivate the manner of  relating to the world (which is 
increasingly resigned, even in despite of  any engagement), which takes on the 
particular having-become as its own past. Time is not a constant category of  
human reason, but rather a form of  meaning with varying rhythm and density 
32  See for instance Hobsbawm, “Inventing Traditions,” and idem: “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 
1870–1914,” 1–14, and 263–308. 
33  Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 286.
34  See Reinhard, “Die hermeneutische Lebensform des Abendlandes,” 68.
35  On the notion of  compensation see Ritter, “Die Aufgabe der Geisteswissenschaften in der modernen 
Gesellschaft,” 105–40.
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which, against the background of  intended and unintended events, is formed by 
common interpretations.36
For the memory paradigm of  coherence, the adequate manner of  relating 
to the past is a continuous reconstruction of  the interconnections of  meaning 
of  events bearing on us. According to the memory sociology of  Maurice 
Halbwachs, which became something of  a project paradigm itself, this task, 
which is indispensible from the perspective of  the present, was always guided 
by the prevailing demands of  groups. Time, born as social reality, is organized 
by the present, commonly lived and inhabited by the members of  the group: 
thus everything falls out from it that, lacking meaning, does not settle within the 
actual referential frameworks of  group life. The force of  memory derives not 
from the past, but from the need for belonging. The place won in the community 
of  memory, which is born as a community rooted in common sentiments and 
dispositions, ensures everyone who belongs to it spatial substance and temporal 
content.37
Jan Assmann regards the past that is embedded in face to face contact, i.e. the 
vistas of  communication that can be seen for three generations, as the broadest 
possible accessible situation of  “culture.”38 The present of  cultural memory 
can relate not only to the recent past of  which account is held in immediate 
social interaction, but also to the “groundwater-deep”39 past that is preserved 
(or, even on the contrary, not preserved!) in memory.40 With the passing of  the 
participants in conversations about things lived as experiences, the process of  
the condensation of  meaning begins, a process that never comes to a close: 
“there is no such thing as original memory.”41 “Objective” culture, which has 
been placed in formed configurations (in other words, culture that has been 
objectified and institutionalized, the historicized successor to the “objective 
spirit” of  philosophical history), is not an unambiguous message, but rather an 
intricately manifold world of  symbols. The ever changing horizon of  meaning 
36  See Rüsen: “Was heißt: Sinn der Geschichte, 17–47. Assmann touches on this: Ägypte, 11.
37  Assmann on Halbwachs for instance, “Erinnern, um dazuzugehören. Schrift“ 101–23. Halbwachs on 
time, La mémoire collective, Chapter 3.
38  In his last book touching on this Halbwachs also makes this step, which covers some two-thousand 
years: La topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre Sainte.
39  Cf. Thomas Mann’s famous opening sentence in his Joseph-tetralogy: „Tief  ist der Brunnen der 
Vergangenheit.”
40  Assmann devoted a separate book to Thomas Mann’s religious theory “book of  time,” Joseph and his 
Brothers.
41  Assmann, Exodus, 101. Also Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 40. 
HHR_2017-4_KÖNYV.indb   739 1/9/2018   3:32:37 PM
740
Hungarian Historical Review 6,  no. 4  (2017): 725–749
of  a given life (acts and experiences) comes into new connections again and 
again with past events in order to nourish the present with (his)stories of  origins, 
i.e. history made into myth by memory. Acts and experiences take place within 
the frameworks of  the historical world of  meaning, which are always in motion.
The memory of  the most ancient groups, preserved in rituals and linguistic 
formula, connected experiences to the foundational mythical ancient time with 
little more than a few mediatory chain links, thus creating and maintaing their 
ties and engagements.42 Festive gatherings lend the significant cadence, which 
is significant because it always returns as common experience. Writing lends 
true depth to time, which thus passes less and less in the spirit of  the eternal 
and unchangeable repetition of  everything. In contrast with the bards, who are 
interested in memory literally repeated, the faith of  the literate man insists not on 
the unerrability of  what is recited, but rather on some kind of  meaning in what 
is written. Instead of  volatile words, re-readable writings contain the treasure 
chest of  meaning, which for groups comprised of  individuals is opening to 
be ever more broad: the contents that can be revived, i.e. that are hoped to be 
alive. The administrative tool of  writing, which in all likelihood was created for 
everyday storage, becomes a tool for orientation in the cosmic world, which is 
identified with its own world. In other words, it becomes the setting for culture, 
understood as cultural memory. This is how writing dons the sanctity of  a 
solemnity that goes beyond the everyday.
Regarding the new manner of  relating to time, the fact that writing can 
be resumed, continued, or forgotten and lost of  course induces change, and 
makes us more sensitive to change. In the emerging written culture, a veritable 
stream of  texts begins to flow in the ceaseless rewriting, writing anew, and 
continued writing towards inundation. While the ever growing distance of  
what has been recorded makes it possible to step out of  the direct bonds, it 
also sanctifies unmoveable and inviolable canons. In other words, it designates 
obligatory points of  reference for every cultural practice, which then, driven 
in part by the fear of  the passing of  the community of  its origins, are taken in 
hand by the activity centered on the cultivation of  meaning, which is tailored to 
the exigencies of  the changing present. The sharpness of  the borders drawn in 
the world of  the mentality depends mostly on the intensity of  the external or 
internal threats to the culture perceived as one’s “own” and the experiences of  
42  On the following see Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 29–160, and idem: “Was ist das ‘kulturelle 
Gedächtnis’?,” 11–44. 
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rupture. Actual conflicts and sharper differentiations can be projected on each 
other with increasing intensity. And if  history begins to become temporal, the 
counter-realities that are excluded with counter-concepts can be characterized as 
belonging exclusively to the past, which from time to time degenerates into their 
expulsion from the present.43
In the end, however, it is not the “spirit of  writing” that decides our 
relationship to events. Slowing the pace of  change and maintaining momentum 
are both cultural accomplishments. One of  the functions of  the Egyptian list of  
kings was to show that over the course of  the millennia that had passed since 
the end of  the era of  the gods nothing worthwhile had happened. The need 
for power to rest on descent or inheritance could find a strong buttress in the 
notes of  the initiated specialists of  memory, notes which were intended either 
to give an impression of  timelessness or to serve forgetfulness. In contrast, 
individualities and particularities that were considered significant gave impetus 
to the institutionalization of  movement: this intellectual attitude, which served 
essentially as the foundation for historical consciousness, can be tied most 
adequately to expectations and hopes of  oppressed situations.
The newest form of  a genuine relationship between memory and identity 
is the attempts to draw ourselves from historical time: immersion into ourselves 
is also immersion into histories. Our culture has thus widely become a culture 
of  memory, in which the self-image of  the people and collectives remembering 
is formed by the events that have taken place involving them and the narratives 
of  these events. Historical memory has become the primary forum for self-
assertion and self-preservation, which makes historical developments (which 
always demand reconstruction) internal. It is not simply that “we are what 
we remember,” but rather, according to the consequentiality of  the idea of  
historicity, because of  the fundamentally temporal nature of  our being, we strive 
to acquire knowledge of  ourselves first and foremost by narrating histories. In 
the orderly system of  narratives, we assure ourselves again and again of  “our 
own roots and goals, truths and dreams.”44
Historical memory borne in communities of  meaning is thus called on to 
mediate between “facts” and “reconstructions”: to create, through rereading, 
the order of  common experiences. Giving up on grand narratives, it strives to 
look both forwards and backwards in histories that can be narrated, driven by 
43  On the latter idea see Koselleck, “The Historical-Political Semantics of  Asymmetric Counterconcepts,” 
155.
44  Assmann, Exodus, 10.
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the compulsion for ever-changing re-narration. Today, historical scholarship  is 
also taking part in the debates concerning the work of  memory, with greater 
sensitivity to ruptures instead of  continuity and plurality instead of  unity. This 
distinctive positive reassessment of  history is tied to precursors from cultural 
Protesantism. Christianity understood as cultural history seeks to convince itself  
of  its own absoluteness in the face of  the relativizing force of  history: we should 
become that which the fertile forces of  the West enable us to be.45
However, according to Assmann’s exemplary case study, the more distant 
socio-cultural precursors of  our preeminent culture of  memory are to be 
sought in the biblical narrative: the primal model and foundational story for our 
historically based culture of  memory is the story of  the exodus from Egypt.46 For 
Israel, the meaningful form of  time is determined by the significance-rich stories 
of  the wanderings with God. The anthropological-cultural factor of  memory 
here is filled with significant contents not by the closedness of  a cosmic order, 
but rather by a process guided by the divine. The compactness of  culture, in 
which power and salvation, truth and righteousness come together in a unity that 
in principle cannot be broken,47 breaks open in ancient Israel. The plethora of  
inscriptions recording the behavioral prescriptions in the late Egyptian temple 
protect the ancient Egyptian regulations of  life from change, even in the midst 
of  threats and experiences of  foreignness.48 In contrast with the community 
that has been anchored in the cosmos and with its self-image, which in the end 
has become iconographically stabilized, the notion of  continuity developing in 
created and creating time is an achievement of  world-historical importance. The 
narrative books of  the biblical redaction draw the bearings of  the own essence 
and proper action not from some unhistorical primal time, but rather from the 
datable past. The commandment to remember in Deuteronomy is a paradigm 
of  unity and belonging that is drawn from the events of  this world (significant 
time-myths). In the soil of  political vicissitudes and historical traumas, in the 
wake of  the unraveling of  the framework-precepts of  the old order of  meaning, 
they recall the memory of  a covenant that was reached with a divine party but 
45  In one of  the most determined projects of  prevailing over historicism within history, theologue Ernst 
Troeltsch claims to find the indisputable superiority of  Christianity in his comparative study of  the whole 
of  history. At this point, Christian theology becomes cultural scholarship. See Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des 
Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte, and Graf–Hartmut Ruddies, “Ernst Troeltsch: Geschichtsphilosophie 
in praktischer Absicht,” 128.
46  Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 196–228, most recently in idem, Exodus.
47  Idem, Ma’at: Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im Alten Ägypten, 177, and idem, Herrschaft und Heil.
48  Idem, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 177.
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which in the meantime has been forgotten.49 God remains faithful to the people 
led out of  the counter-world of  Egypt and keeps his promise to its descendants. 
According to the account, which is of  dubious historical credibility, the book of  
the covenant, which unexpectedly rises from oblivion, prompts the shaken king 
Josiah to return to Yahweh. The powerful stories of  sinfulness and liberation 
become symbolic figures of  memory, which originally were born by a kingdom 
striving to assert legitimacy and a small monotheistic religious movement. 
In opposition to the terror of  forgetting, it becomes necessary to develop a 
technology of  memory that chisels into the heart.50 The history is made theology 
by the counter-stories of  figures of  commemoration of  liberation. The event of  
the covenant between God and his people demands ceaseless “chiseling into 
the heart, confirmation, and teaching”:51 the prophets read the twists of  fate 
as consequences of  faithlessness; the everyday order of  reviving memory is 
canonized by the continuous editorial work of  the priesthood.
At the same time, Assmann performs a backtracking of  the memory traces 
which are often beneath the surface, unconscious, or simply suppressed, by 
ascribing them to the primary differentiations of  our own culture. Thus, light 
is also cast on their unfortunate consequences, consequences which intellectual 
attempts were made again and again to interrupt, for instance by appealing to a 
counter-history. The very influential counter-memory of  the cosmo-theist unity 
set in opposition to the monotheist unity, the figure of  the “Egyptian Moses,” 
always reemerges from memory,52 which then seeks a broader Ecumene than the 
Mosaic distinction between true and false religion. The outlines of  the structural 
intolerance lurking in monotheism’s demand for exclusiveness emerge out of  
the contrast of  a counter-world based on a divergent principle (compactness 
in the absence of  differentiation), the serious precondition of  which is that 
the conquered are willing to correspond to the dominant pantheon, organized 
according to similar functions.
The theoretical withdrawal from a history highly significant for us (taken 
backwards in time) leads to a fundamentally different world, the time structure of  
which presents a different model. For the order of  time valid for the world that 
preceded and surrounded the biblical world (i.e. for the traditional consciousness 
of  time in ancient Egypt), the present was nothing more than the past, present 
49  See for instance Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 257.
50  See Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewisch Memory.
51  Assmann, Exodus, 117, cf. Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization. 79, 196, and 272.
52  Idem, Moses der Ägypter, and idem, Die Mosaische Unterscheidung.
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in the present.53 In every ruler, the predecessors continued to function in that 
the ruler kept both the country and the world as a whole in momentum, linking 
tomorrow to yesterday. The individual human life takes place with its back to 
the future, gazing towards the past. Gratitude felt for good deeds links it to 
the community, while with its acts it builds its own monument. According to 
morality inherent to time, the real sin is not breaking the promise concerning 
the future, but rather forgetting the past.54 The distance from the era of  mythic 
ancient images does not grow smaller with the passing of  time. A past, strictly 
understood, is only supported by an unexpected break of  what was, until it was 
ruptured, a whole. For Egypt, the foreign rule of  Assyria and Persia meant the 
intrusion of  chaos. 
With regards to the aspects of  time of  the cultural memory of  the West, in 
its biblical framework, the impossibility of  ever bringing retrospection to a close 
implies a past that is always to be understood in the plural. Myth “is renewed 
together with every shifting present, which wins a new tinge of  meaning out 
of  it.”55 Myth wins its uninterrupted renewal from the wealth of  versions of  
memory and counter-memory, since in this wealth old and new, disclosed and 
obstructed, built and buried, canonical and apocryphal, orthodox and heterodox 
come into tension with one another.56 Fundamental dualities run throughout 
the biblical text itself: the desert in contrast with the city, Israel in contrast with 
Judea, the state in contrast with religion, prophets in contrast with priests, the 
exclusiveness of  Exodus in contrast with the universality of  creation. If  the 
subversive and excluded remain part of  memory (which is often beneath the 
surface), then the articulation of  contents bursting from the unconscious and 
the vanishing of  narrative contents into the background never come to an end. 
“Even that which is new can only appear in the form of  the reconstructed 
past.”57 The alternative past, which creates a contrast with the present, creates 
non-synchronicity, in which the primary present can be turned out of  its corners 
with “saving” counter-stories.58
As a countermove to the overly strong demand for coherence, the work of  
drawing nigh and distancing is constantly underway: in the process of  narrating 
53  On the following see idem, Steinzeit und Sternzeit, 261.
54  Idem, Herrschaft und Heil, Chapter 7.
55  Idem, Exodus, 101.
56  See idem, “Was ist das ‘kulturelle Gedächtnis’,” 38.
57  Idem, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 42.
58  Ibid, 78, and 222, with reference to the concept-formation of  Protestant theologue Gerd Theißen, 
“contra-present memory”.
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ourselves, we present ourselves as if  in a mirror in a new history again and again. 
Although the project of  “cultural remembering” speaks about and to the person 
living the present together with others as it unfolds in histories, our validities are 
always tied to given groups and their narrations of  history, which immediately 
throws their origins into uncertainty. Origin as some kind of  “other” who can 
and should be addressed is always, superfluously, at our disposal, as it were. In 
this model, this is the legitimate place for the intrusion of  novelty. In spite of  
the openness to the future, this future, which structures itself  through memory, 
is not the future of  the promises of  progress, but rather the future of  conjurings 
of  the past. Here, the weight of  presentism rests on the present concerning 
things past.
The paradigmatic story of   Exodus, of  course, is also the Western story of  
the shared search for freedom.59 The flight from the symbolic space of  “Egypt” 
is the break from the bad order of  servitude and the entry into the order of  
freedom. This revolutionary story, which is always available for retelling, is the 
tradition of  self-liberation, the roots of  which lie in tradition.
In front of  finitude, commemoration pulls lines of  origin towards its plans, 
which with regards to the handling of  time is a strategy of  deceleration.60 The 
present, which bears histories, can become overburdened at any time, of  course: 
sometimes with the tremendous compulsion of  the past, sometimes with the 
contingency of  its handholds. As a possibility that lies outside the inner-worldly 
transcendence of  the past, the step from the changes into a transcendent state 
above or beyond time remains. This is an allegedly unbounded project with an 
existentialist self-projection into the future, in a religious or a secular manner.
A Concluding Remark
On the basis of  a still usable typology of  G.W.F. Hegel concerning the writing 
of  history in modernity, we have discussed two systematic theoretical attitudes 
to memory with very opposite relations to the past. The first one is centered 
preferably around forgetting for the sake of  a functional efficacy, while 
the second draws on significant pasts for the sake of  creative stability. Both 
theoretical programs are marked by a high grade of  intellectual consistency 
and can thus serve even empirical investigations into our modern stance, as 
59  See Walzer, Exodus and Revolution; Menke, “Die Lehre des Exodus: Der Auszug aus der Knechtschaft,” 
47–54.
60  See A. Assmann, Zeit und Tradition.
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consistency, according to Max Weber, “has and always has had power over man, 
however limited and unstable this power is and always has been in the face of  
other forces of  historical life”.61
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